By Konstantin PREOBRAZHENSKY.

                         NORTH KOREAN LOBBY IN RUSSIA.

                                1. Facilitating nuclear espionage.

        Intelligence communities of Russia and North Korea have the same origin: Stalin’s NKVD. It produces the base for some sort of psychological closeness between their officers even today.

    There is a lot of similarity in them. The structure of the North Korean Ministry of State Security reminds that of the KGB of the Soviet period and today’s FSB. Following the Russian example, the Ministry Of State Security maintains a large network of regional departments all over the country. Both Russian and North Korean security services pay special attention to the recruitment of civil collaborators, both foreign and native.

    The   North Korean Ministry of Social Security (Police) controls the country’s population through the system of residence permit, inherited from Stalin’s Russia. In North Korea it is as strict now, as it was in Russia under Stalin.

   Military counterintelligence is also created according to the Russian pattern.  It is also called “the Special Department” like in Russia. Its goal is the same too: the search for ideological dissidents and foreign spies among soldiers and officers.

   But there is a significant difference with Russia, where military counterintelligence belongs to the FSB. In North Korea the Army itself manages it. But such a situation has been the dream of Russian generals for many decades! They have been urging the old Soviet and new Russian leaders to withdraw military counterintelligence from the KGB and order it to the Army. They don’t want the KGB to control them! But the Russian leadership always refuses the generals’ request and prefers to continue controlling them through the FSB.

    And North Korean generals have succeeded in convincing their leadership! It shows that the political role of the Army in North Korea is much stronger than in Russia. It is really so: Russian military leadership is traditionally very dependent on the FSB.

    The power ministries of today’s Russia have become very numerous, but they are all infiltrated by the FSB.  One may even say, that they all have faces of one and the same FSB.

     It backs them. If any of such ministries signs an agreement of cooperation with North Korea, it only means, that the FSB has concluded one more agreement with it. The recent conclusion of   the Customs Cooperation Agreement between Russia and North Korea on October 8, 2003 gives an eloquent example of this.(1)

   When you ask a Russian Customs officer for his business card, he may proudly hand you the one with the inscription “FSB”, or even “KGB” as if it were Soviet times now. It is a sort of stylishness among the officers of civil institutions in today’s Russia: to demonstrate openly, with a victorious smile, their belonging to the highest elite, the KGB.

    The text of the Customs Cooperation Agreement makes this impression: predominance of the FSB is not even concealed there!

   In particular, it says about “mutual aid in law-enforcement activity”. But such an activity is not the task of the Customs Office!  It is the prerogative of law-enforcement agencies! On the state border such an activity is run by the FSB.

    Smuggling flourishes on the Russian-Korean border, in spite of this agreement. The Custom Offices of both sides simply ignore it, because the smuggling is run by the North Korean state.  The above-mentioned Customs Agreement seems to have only one aim: to secure this smuggling by the FSB.

  “The land border between North Korea and Russia is constantly used for smuggling military and nuclear equipment and raw materials. Even the smuggling of military helicopters was attempted there, ” wrote   “Physicians for Human Rights” in their Declaration of February 14, 2003. This organization has 5000 members and is based in Vladivostok, not far from the North Korean border. It aims to join together Russian, Japanese, Korean and Chinese physicians in order not to allow Kim Jong Il to blackmail the world with nuclear threat.(2) 

    The Declaration says that parts of nuclear reactors are stolen from the plants of conversion of atomic submarines in Russia’s Far East and are smuggled to North Korea.

 All those parts are in working condition and good for utilization. Well-organized criminal bands steal them. Recently the director of the largest plant of   atomic submarine conversion, located near Vladivostok, was killed. It might have been caused by the struggle for sphere of influence between criminal bands.  “Physicians for Human Rights” emphasized that it is impossible to control    illegal shipping of nuclear reactors to North Korea by fishing and transport vessels.

    “Physicians for Human Rights” have also conducted a distance computer diagnostics of Kim Jong Il’s mental state. It is close to a pathological one. He has paranoia and some maniacal features.  It brings great danger for millions of people, but in Russia, aiming for cordial friendship with Kim Jong Il, they prefer to ignore such statements.

    North Korea is also running illegal extraction of uranium in Russia, though all the uranium mines should be under the rigid control by the FSB.

    Uranium is extracted in small amounts at the pit “Swallow”, located near the North Korean logging enterprise in Chegdomyn (Khakarovsk region, Russian Far East). It was   temporary closed down in the 1970s.    Its concrete plugs are broken, and local residents frequently find North Korean newspapers and empty cans from preserved food there. Sometimes they even meet Koreans, who don’t look like lumbermen. They have radiation detectors and other technical equipment with them.   But local residents prefer to hide in the shrubs. The meeting with North Koreans in the forest is dangerous; they may kill an undesirable witness.

   There are no people around the pit, hidden in the thick Far Eastern forest, called “taiga”. The nearest village Zimovye is located in 60 kilometers (36 miles) from there.

   The uranium pit “Swallow” is not guarded at all. Instead of it the FSB prefers other work: to cooperate with its North Korean colleagues in catching lumbermen defectors from Chegdomyn in order not to allow them to ask for political asylum in South Korea or Russia. The agreement about it was signed in 1970s and is still in effect.(3)

   North Korean intelligence cunningly utilizes the financial troubles of Russian science to get access to secret nuclear technology.  Scientific research is very poorly financed by the state in Russia, and atomic studies are not an exception.

   On January 29, 2003, the Russian Institute of Atomic Machinery Construction ran a press conference to declare two items. The first one was about the discovery of the lead reactor. It could be loaded with lead instead of uranium. This discovery could be very important for Russia, because the main uranium mines of the Soviet period were left in Kazakhstan. The discovery was brand new and had not been officially approved by the Academy of Science yet. That’s why its security status had not been determined.

  And secondly that the Institute suffered an urgent need for money: the Committee of State Property had decided to auction it’s building.

   This all immediately attracted the attention of the North Korean Embassy. The First Secretary Jong Men Jong, who is in charge of nuclear energy, rushed to the press conference. He took with him one more diplomat, Wong Gwang Sen, whose responsibility was kept secret.

    At the end of the press conference, the assistant of the director of the Institute approached the North Korean diplomats and said:”We respect Korean scholars and may offer something to you. Please come the Director’s office for a private talk”.(4)

   This deal was at least half-legal! The technology was sold privately, before it was   officially approved by the state.  Such a doubtful deal about a nuclear reactor should cause immediate involvement and investigation by the FSB, but not in this case. Though all the institutes, running nuclear studies, have a lot of FSB officers in their leading staff and civil FSB collaborators among scientists…

   But if   Americans or Japanese diplomats or businessmen ventured to do the same, the FSB would provoke a sensational spy scandal, as it had done about American businessman Edmond Pope in 2000.

    The key North Korean partner in nuclear studies in Russia has always been the United Institute of Nuclear Research, located in the city of Dubna (Moscow region). It became the starting point for the nuclear program of North Korea in 1956, when its scientists began to work there in 1956.  250 of them trained at the Institute till the early 1990s, when the Institute’s cooperation with North Korea was stopped.

   But recently it was resumed. In March 2002, The United Institute of Nuclear Research signed a new agreement with North Korea. In July 2002, the director of the Institute received a letter from Li Chen Son, the President of North Korean Chief Directorate of Atomic Energy. He invited the Director to Pyongyang and reported about the dispatching of three North Korean scientists to his Institute.

  They seem to work there now, because some “National group from North Korea” is registered on the Institute’s website. But detailed information in unavailable. Secrets of this kind are strictly guarded by the FSB.(5)

                                     2. The dictators’ lobby.

    The FSB is the protector of North Korean activity in Russia, the leader of North Korean lobby. The core of this lobby consists of Russian elite sharing Communist ideology and sympathizing with Kim Jong Il: Army generals, the Intelligence community and numerous concealed Communists in state bureaucracy. All of them join one more lobby, the pro-Iraqi one. It is the dictators’ lobby.

    One may wonder why those people are headed by the FSB. For Russians the answer is clear: because the FSB is the part of mammoth apparatus of the Soviet Communist Party. It managed to survive after the collapse of Russian Communism in 1991, resurge and return to power under President Putin.  It is the FSB who rules Russia now.

   The KGB, the predecessor of the FSB, initially was created within the bureaucratic stricture of the Communist Party to protect it. The KGB proudly called itself “The armed detachment of the Communist Party”.

   Even now the FSB and Communist Party demonstrate integrity. For example,  most advisors and secretaries to the members of the Communist Deputies of the State Duma (Russian Parliament) are officers of the FSB, both retired and acting.

   The key political figure, personifying the unity of Communists, security services and other state bureaucracy, is Evgeni Primakov.  Previously he was the Prime  Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the SVR, Foreign Intelligence Service. He is a hard-liner, a man of extremely anti-Western outlooks. Now he is the leading political advisor to President Putin.

   As soon as Primakov was appointed the Director of the SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, he repudiated the fact of the existence of nuclear weapon in North Korea.  Though the Soviet KGB had recognized it previously, and its Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov wrote the following in his report #363-k to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1990:” The working out of the first atomic explosive device in Yongbyon is completed.  Its testing is not planned in order to conceal the very fact of production of atomic weapons in North Korea   from the world opinion and controlling organizations”.

   But later Primakov wrote something opposite in the first public report of the SVR in 1993:“North Korea doesn’t possess atomic weapon”.(6)

   Since that time Russia only had “doubted” about nuclear bomb in North Korea until it was tested in October 2006.

     It was easy for Primakov to create the North Korean lobby in the pro-Communist Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A lot of former officers of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist party had found shelter there after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    Now   the Russian Foreign Ministry doesn’t hesitate in taking the North Korean side even when its diplomats commit crimes. For example, when they   refuse to pay back the borrowed money to Russian creditors.

     This story began in Khabarovsk in May 1997, and is still going on.(7) According to “Khabarovsk Express” of April 2006, on May 17, 1997, North Korean diplomat Che Gim Cher, the head of the Trade Representation in Khabarovsk, borrowed $1500 from a local businessman Vladimir Oleinikov. He said that he needed money to pay office expenses and promised to return it in a few days. He even delivered a guarantee letter on the letterhead of the North Korean Embassy. The document said the following:” Receipt. This is to confirm that the Habarovsk Sector of the Department of the Trade Counselor of the Embassy of Korean People’s Democratic Republic borrowed $1500 from the President of the private company “Lord VB Oleinikov”. We bind ourselves to return the money on May 29, 1997. In case of failure we bind ourselves to pay 1% of the borrowed sum for every day of delay”.

   But the money was not returned. Russian businessmen sent a letter of complaint to Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister.

   He got a reply only the following year. V.Chupin, the Representative of Foreign Ministry in Khabarovsk region, signed it. The letter said, that North Korean authorities don’t recognize Oleinikov’s requirements. They say, that the money was returned to him through a man called Nikolayev. “Mr.Nikolayev has confirmed it in a talk with Mr.Kim Sen Ren, the officer of the Embassy of Korean Peoples Democratic Republic”.

“But who is  Nikolayev?” wondered Vladimir Oleinikov, “And why his oral explanation was enough for such a serious organization, as Foreign Ministry? Why didn’t they look at my document?”

   Vladimir Oleinikov was deeply insulted by the fact, that the Russian Foreign Ministry didn’t pretend the slightest intention to defend him, a Russian businessman, and immediately supported the North Koreans.

   Vladimir Oleinikov sent a letter of complaint to Kim Jong Il himself. And  after that his stay in Khabarovsk became dangerous. Koreans tried to kill him.

    In fear of his life Vladimir Oleinikov immigrated to Israel in 2000. But North Korean intelligence found him even there in the end of 2001! They urged him to return the promissory note in exchange for 50 000 dollars, because the sum of the debt had reached the enormous figure of 21 billion!  But Vladimir Oleinikov refused to do it. He is still waiting for the proper debt payment, though he knows, that his life is in danger.

   Not only Russian diplomats, but also some distinguished experts on Korea join North Korean lobby. They are prominent scholars, sharing Communist outlooks. It was also Evgeni Primakov who created it.

    In the 1980s he was the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Science. Initially it used to be an academic center for the study of ancient history and philosophy of Asia, but Primakov definitely turned it into a branch of the KGB. He put emphasis on the studies of modern politics and ordered scholars to write informational materials for the KGB intelligence.  Almost all the scholars were recruited as civil collaborators and had to work for the KGB during their scientific studies abroad.

    Professor Yury Vanin, the Head of Department of Korea and Mongolia of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is a typical representative of the North Korean lobby. He is a fanatic worshipper and protector of Kim Jong Il. As soon as a wave of criticism of Kim rises in Russian press, Professor Vanin repulses it, accusing journalists of a lack of patriotism. His logic is simple: Kim is Russia’s friend, and those who oppose him are against Russia.

In August 2003, Russian newspaper  ”Izvestia” discussed the possibility of a preventive strike on North Korea by Russian military. This article angered   Professor Vanin greatly. In his own article, published by the Communist newspaper “The Soviet Russia” on August 16,2003, he accused journalists of “Izvestia” of  “open calls to war, violating the Russian Constitution” and held their article up to shame them as “an irresponsible escapade by idle journalists”. He appealed directly to President Putin with the request to “institute criminal procedures against irresponsible liars from “Izvestia”, thus calling for the repressions against journalists.(8)

    But at the same time his article was very kind to North Korea. He wrote: ” The Korean People’s Democratic Republic is not going to attack anybody. In respond to the US threat it is forced to take necessary measures of counteraction and self-defense. And it has the right to demand immediate apology for the  “Izvestia” article”.

   But the highest leader of the Korean experts’ lobby is Academician Mikhail Titarenko, the Director of the Far East Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.  His recommendations exert decisive influence upon the formation of the official opinion of the Russian government about the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

  Like a lot of the Russian elite, he openly admires Kim Jong Il. “No matter whether somebody likes it or not, Kim Jong Il is a real and recognized leader. North Korea by itself is a small and weak country, but other countries are running such serious negotiations with it. Isn’t that the index of skillful politics by the leadership?” –said Academician Mikhail Titarenko in one of his interviews in September 2003.

  He also protects North Korea from foreign invasion and emphasizes the following: ”The North Korean population unanimously supports its authorities. Americans won’t solve the problem by surgical strikes, and the long drawn out military conflict on the Korean Peninsula would negatively affect international politics”.(9)

   Also   Academician Mikhail Titarenko is the Vice-President of the Russian Society of Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with North Korea.              

  It looks abnormal, that the key presidential advisor on both Koreas is supervising a society of friendship with one of them. It makes his recommendations one-sided. May be, it is just what Putin wants?

    Communists manage this Society. On November 10, 2003 it celebrated its tenth anniversary. The Society was founded during the Communist riot in autumn 1993. It was symbolic. The establishment of the Society became a part of the campaign of Communist restoration in Russia.

  Vladimir Tolstikov, the President of the Society, wrote the following about those days in the Communist newspaper “Glasnost”:” It was the period of fierce anti-Communist hysteria in Russian mass media. A lot of lies was spread about Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. We resolutely appeared for their defense”.(10)

   Vladimir Tolstikov is a former Soviet Ambassador in North Korea, admirer and friend of Kim Il Sung.

    Also he is a former military and has the rank of Rear Admiral. And the rest of the leadership of the Society are military generals too: M.Babikov, V.Popkov,S.Kramarenko, D.Oskin. There are too many generals for a friendship society!

     All of them are retirees, but they have a lot of younger colleagues, who still occupy high military posts. It is no problem for them to obtain sensitive military information and share it with their Communist friends from North Korea. Its Ambassador Pa Y Chun is a frequent guest of the Society. And its possible sponsor too.

     Now North Koreans must be hunting for Russian intelligence information about the USA, Japan, China and South Korea in connection with nuclear crises. Well, the stations of GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence Service, are very active in each of those four countries.

   It’s interesting, that the same military emphasis is characteristic for the regional Friendship Societies too! For example, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Egorov heads this Society in Karelia, an autonomous republic near the Finnish border.

       Also Victor Egorov is the leader of Karelian branch of the All Russian Political Movement “In Support of Army, Defense Industry and Military Science”.(11)

   This pro-Communist movement proclaims the restoration of Communism, the Soviet Union and its bygone power.  It unites all those officers of the Army, secret military plants and science, who are dissatisfied with the current political regime in Russia and dream of its changing. And Lieutenant Colonel Victor Egorov provides them a connection with North Korea.  Surely its military intelligence guides all Russian societies of friendship with North Korea!

    Interestingly, all the forms of North Korean contacts with Russia are imbued with military interest. Even the religious ones!

    In November 2002, the delegation of the Believers’ Society of North Korea visited the Moscow Patriarchy. The visit was connected with the construction of a Russian Church in Pyongyang. But the delegation conducted negotiations not only with the International Department of Moscow Patriarchy, which was quite natural.  It also negotiated    with the Department for Cooperation with Military Forces and Law-Enforcement Institutions!(12)

   What for? Nobody knows. May be, Kim wants to baptize his army? Or to control it through the Church?  Anyway, Kim showed, that the contacts with the Russian Church were necessary to him for military purposes.

   But Russia’s chief North Korean military advisor is Marshal Dmitry Yazov, the last Soviet Defense Minister and an organizer of 1991 Communist coup.

   He is Kim Jong Il’s personal friend. Marshal Yazov says proudly, that Kim is always “open and available to him” during his frequent visits to North Korea. When Kim Jong Il visited Russia in 2001 and 2002, Marshal Yazov met him on the platform of every station along his train’s route across Russia.

  Now Marshal Yazov is a constant and most honorable guest at the Embassy of North Korea in Moscow. He might know all the military secrets of the Soviet period, and there is no problem for him to acquire current information.

      The Russian North Korean lobby is active also in Byelorussia, Russian satellite. They have a sort of union state, and Russia entirely controls Byelorussia.

   Friendship with North Korea is a matter of the highest state priority there. Victor Chikin, the Chairman of the Communist Party, heads the Society of Friends of North Korea personally.

    Communists support Byelorussia dictator Lukashenko. Thanks to him, the Byelorussia Communist Party received back all the property, which was confiscated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.   It was done only in Byelorussia and not in any other republic of the former USSR.  Lukashenko gives special favor to Communists.  He preserved the totalitarian socialist system in his country. The Chairman of the Communist Party there is an even more important figure than in Russia.

   Russia and Byelorussia have a joint KGB. It is called “The FSB Council for cooperation with the KGB of Byelorussia”.

    Russia governs Byelorussia through this connection.  Byelorussia intelligence abroad is under the guidance of the SVR, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

   But Byelorussia is a poor country and needs economic aid itself. It can hardly do a lot for North Korea. Most probably the Byelorussia Society of Friends of North Korea is utilized by Russia for the most delicate and secret contacts with North Korea. Anyhow, you can’t find a word about the activities of the Society in the state-controlled local media. And if you go there to run a journalistic survey, Byelorussia KGB will arrest you for espionage.

                                     3. FSB’s special envoy to Pyongyang.

           All Russian Communists support North Korea, but the Russian Communist Workers’ Party is especially friendly to it.  This Party is also called  “The Labor Russia”.

    This mid-size Communist Party was founded by the FSB in the early 1990s in order to provoke mass riots against President Yeltsin’s government. Contrary to the “official” Communist Party of Russian Federation, “Labor Russia” is inclined to terror and possesses some guerilla detachments. They shot governmental troops and policemen during the Communist riot in 1993. Victor Anpilov, leader of  “Labor Russia”, was arrested by the FSB, but quietly released very quickly. He is a long-time KGB collaborator.

 In  1970 Victor Anpilov worked as the TASS correspondent in Latin America, and all Russian foreign correspondents at that time had to be KGB agents.

   Victor Anpilov’s connections with the FSB are well known. There were a lot of publications about it in the mass media.  It was the FSB who promoted Victor Anpilov to leader of “Labor Russia”.

    Kim Jong Il admired his extremism and fanatic devotion to Communism. He ordered North Korean diplomats to contact Anpilov in September 1991.

   It took place on the Red Square, where “Labor Russia” was running a noisy demonstration near the Mausoleum of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union. They were protesting against the possible withdrawal of Lenin’s body and its burial in the soil in accordance with Christian rites. Yeltsin’s Administration planned to do it, and the activists of “Labor Russia” surrounded the Mausoleum with human barricade.

   North Korean diplomats said the following: ”Comrade Anpilov! Comrade Kim Jong Il thanks you for not allowing the desecration of Lenin’s burial-vault!”

   And very soon Anpilov got a heavy package from North Korea. It was Kim Jong Il’s present: five very powerful megaphones for mass meetings. The very next day their deafening and frightening sounds could be heard on the streets of Moscow. Monitoring the meetings of “Labor Russia” as a journalist, I suffered from the noise. It    didn’t let me interview people, because they couldn’t hear me. But I could not imagine that it was thanks to Kim Jong Il. None of other journalists thought so either.

  Somebody had kept it secret. Though it was a direct interference of North Korea into Russian political life.

   In the spring of 1993 Kim Jong Il invited Victor Anpilov to North Korea to celebrate Independence Day. Kim greeted the Russian Communist personally and said the following in Russian: ”Comrade Anpilov! We all know “Labor Russia”. You protected Lenin’s Mausoleum!”  Victor Anpilov used to recall it with tears on his eyes.

   In Pyongyang he stayed in    a luxurious three-floor house.  A group of security service officers visited him every night and spoke till morning, drinking vodka. Such things are characteristic for recruitment. Anpilov didn’t even conceal it in his book “Our Struggle”(Moscow, 1999)!

   He wrote: ”I asked one of those officers how they managed to predict all my desires. He answered with a smile:” It is a professional secret! When you come to Pyongyang next time, we shall fulfill your desires before you feel them!”(13)

    For a person, familiar with intelligence, the words of North Korean officer meant only one: they had studied Anpilov’s personality very well before the recruitment. It is required by the professional rules, inherited by North Koreans from the Russian KGB.

   Nowadays Victor Anpilov frequently visits the North Korean Embassy in Moscow. Surely the FSB instructs him before every visit. And after it he meets the FSB once more to report, what his North Korean counterparts ordered him to pass them.

 In the fall of 2003, Anpilov’s Party “Labor Russia” issued a declaration of support for North Korea in connection with it’s leaving the non-proliferation treaty.  Anpilov praised this decision from the bottom of his heart. It is honorable to be a North Korean agent in today’s Russia.(14)  

                                     4.Ideological lobby.

The activities of North Korean lobby in Russia have only outward resemblance with Western lobbyism, determined by Webster’s dictionary as “a group pf lobbyists representing the same special interest.”(15)

It also has some specific features of today’s Russian lobbyism, described by Peter B.Necalsurmer, Chairman & CEO, the PBN Company, as following:” Lobbying in the West is highly regulated and monitored. In Russia, there is no formal system, few applicable laws, and no regulation. But the actual process of lobbying is quite similar, especially when it comes to the influence of money”.(16)

But the last word of this quotation is essential to determine its principal difference with the Western lobbyist groups: North Korean lobby in Russia doesn’t work for money. It is not interested in working for money. It works for the sake of Communist ideology. It is an ideological lobby.

And North Korea did not hire them as lobbyists. They are acting independently, on their own initiative. It is the second distinction with the Western lobbyism.

Lobbyists are acting as patrons to those, whom they promote. It is a lobbyism of the seniors to juniors. Stalin has demonstrated such kind of lobbyism to the World by creating North Korean state. Today’s North Korean lobby in Russia derives from it.

It has only some superficial likeness with Western lobbyism. And has nothing in common with Western democracy, because Communist ideology denies it. It brings totalitarian consciousness.

North Korean lobby consists of high-ranking Russian governmental bureaucrats, sharing Communist views and promoting rebirth of dictatorship in Russia. The very same people supported Saddam Hussein and were part of the Iraqi lobby. But they accepted millions of bribes from Saddam Hussein, because he was just only a dictator, not a Communist.  His ideological integrity with his lobbyists in Russia was only partial, and not complete. It was not enough to be served free of charge. That’s why he had to pay for lobbyism. While Kim Jong Il is a pure Communist dictator, like Lenin or Stalin. It exempts him from any charge. He is served free.

Some part of North Korean lobby in Russia doesn’t hide its support of Kim Jong Il, and another part does. The first one is comprised of a Communist Party and the Korean specialists, while the second is composed of FSB and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The second group operates like secret collaborators, or “agents of influence”, as they are called in the KGB textbooks. Traditionally, the KGB mostly relies on those collaborators, who were recruited not with money or by fear of exposure of their crimes, but on the basis of integrity of Communist political views. Such agents may work without financial compensation. This definition also may be applied to the concealed part of the North Korean lobby in Russia.      

1. Press Service of the Far Eastern Customs Department, October 10,2003.
2. http://mednovosti.ru/pr/2003/02/14/vrach/
3. http://www.eg.ru/Publication.mhtml?PublD=1353&Part=10
4. Sergei Petuhov, ”Russian nuclear scientists get energy from the lead”. Moscow, “Kommersant-Daily”, January 30,2003.
5. http//www.dubna.ru/news/2/2002-07-26.
6. Vladimir Voronov, “Delayed-action bomb”, Moscow, “New Times”,#3, January 19, 2003.
7. http://www.e-oligarch.com/xnews/xnewsone.php3?table.
8. Yu Vanin, ”No wits, no heart”. Moscow, “Soviet Russia”#90, August 16, 2003.
9. http://w-gorchakov.narod.ru
10. http://asiainfo.narod.ru/weekly/01_09_09_2000
11. Victor Makarov,”The ideas of “juche” are popular here too”. Karelian Daily Newspaper “Northern Courier”, March 14, 2002.
12. http://www.agnuz.info?index.php?year=2002.
13. Victor Anpilov, “Our struggle”. Moscow, “Labour Russia”, 1999.
14. http://tr.rkrp-rpk.ru/get.php?10.
15.  “Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary”, Second Edition, p.1060.
16. Peter B Necarsulmer, “Lobbying. Russian-style”. St-Petersburg, American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, “Amcham-News”, November 8, 2004.